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Abstract—The first release of the 5G protocol specifica-
tions, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release
15, were published in December 2017 and the first 5G
protocol security specifications in March 2018. As one of
the technology cornerstones for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2X),
Vehicle-to-Everything (V2E) systems and other critical
systems, 5G defines some strict communication goals,
such as massive device connectivity, sub-10ms latency
and ultra high bit-rate. Likewise, given the firm security
requirements of certain critical applications expected to be
deployed on this new cellular communications standard,
5G defines important security goals. As such, 5G networks
are intended to address known protocol vulnerabilities
present in both legacy GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications) networks as well as current LTE (Long
Term Evolution) mobile systems. This manuscript presents
a summary and analysis of the current state of affairs in 5G
protocol security, discussing the main areas that should still
be improved further before 5G systems go live. Although
the 5G security standard documents were released just a
year ago, there is a number of research papers detailing
security vulnerabilities, which are summarized in this
manuscript as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the most
recent cellular communication standard deployed
globally. Independent of, and co-existing with, pre-
vious generations of different technologies for mo-
bile access, all operators globally have converged
towards LTE over the last 5 years for the current
generation of mobile communication. Meanwhile,
the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has
already released the first batch of specifications for
the next leap in mobile communication systems,
generally referred to as Fifth Generation (5G).
The growing demand for connectivity and fast
data transfer, along with new trends such as the
Internet of Things (IoT) [1], Vehicle to Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle to Everything (V2E) - for which
current mobile architectures are far from appropriate
- and other critical applications expected to take off
with the advent of 5G triggered a major redesign of
mobile systems at all levels in the context of 5G.
The industry generally highlighted five major goals
for 5G networks, namely: 1) higher system capacity,
2) higher data rates - with gigabit per second (Gbps)
being the standard claim, 3) reduced latency, with
a rather optimistic, yet promising, target of under
10ms latency, 4) massive device connectivity and
5) energy savings [2]. It is interesting to note that,
a couple of years later, the industry seems to have
shifted to a condensed ”3 pillar” model for 5G [3].
Some of the most mature technologies already being
tested to tackle such 5G demands are milliliter wave
(mmWave) communication, with carrier frequencies
well above the common 6GHz boundary, and mas-
sive MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) arrays
with hundreds of antennas.
At the cornerstone of today’s digital and con-
nected society, LTE cellular networks deliver today
advanced services for billions of users, beyond tra-
ditional voice communication and short messaging.
These same services will be supported in the near
future by 5G communication systems. Moreover,
mobile networks are also the connectivity layer
for critical communication infrastructure, from first
responder systems [4] to ad-hoc military tactical
networks [5]. Therefore, the security of mobile
systems is of prime importance in LTE and will
still be in 5G. After a rather unsuccessful service
record, with the first generation lacking support
for encryption, GSM networks being vulnerable to
several exploits [6] and LTE recently having been
found vulnerable to similar exploits [7]–[10], the
ongoing definition and design of 5G systems is
the critical time to implement some long over-
due security enhancements for cellular networks.
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However, a number of security weaknesses in the
5G protocols have already been identified [11]–
[14], both unsolved security vulnerabilities carrying
over from LTE and previous generations, and new
vulnerabilities introduced to 5G.
Most of the current protocol security threats
at layer 2 in mobile networks span from legacy
security architectures. Despite the addition of so-
phisticated encryption algorithms, mutual authen-
tication and other functions, mobile networks still
implement a rather outdated symmetric key and
circuit-switched architecture and heavily rely in the
implicit trust on pre-authentication messages that
could be arriving from a malicious base station. So
far, the majority of protocol security vulnerabilities
identified by security researchers in legacy protocols
and LTE are indeed rooted in the inherent trust
both mobile devices as well as base stations place
on all layer 2 messages exchanged prior to the
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol
is executed [15]. It is important to note, though,
that despite 5G introducing an improved version
of this AKA algorithm, researchers already found
concerning flaws in the new proposed algorithm
[12], [14].
There has been a substantial effort in address-
ing known LTE protocol exploits with particular
focus on preventing International Mobile Subscriber
Identifier (IMSI) catchers or Stingrays [16]. As a
result, 5G introduces the Subscription Permanent
Identifier (SUPI), as replacement of the IMSI, and
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which allows
the encryption of the SUPI into the Subscription
Concealed Identifier (SUCI) [17].
However, preventing protocol exploits that lever-
age pre-authentication messages is a key security
design goal for 5G still pending to be fully ad-
dressed. Despite the efforts to design a secure
architecture, a number of insecure protocol edge
cases still exist and no specific solution has been
proposed yet to prevent pre-authentication message-
based attacks. Given the strict security requirements
that most 5G applications enforce, these are critical
areas that should be tackled in the context of 5G
security.
Although there are several areas in which secu-
rity should be improved as mobile communication
technology transitions towards 5G, this manuscript
highlights a subset of them, including privacy and
authentication. Based on the current state of affairs
in 5G protocol security, a detailed analysis of the
main challenges in securing 5G wireless networks
is presented.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as
follows. Section II summarizes the current state of
affairs in 5G security and Section III contextualizes
known LTE security vulnerabilities within the scope
of 5G. Section IV overviews the main available tools
and testbeds leveraged by security researchers and,
potentially, adversaries to explore the security of
LTE and 5G. Finally, Section V presents a series
of potential architectural enhancements for 5G to
improve the security of the protocol and Section VI
delivers some concluding remarks.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN 5G
SECURITY
The first version of the LTE specifications (3GPP
Release 8) was published in 2007, and the first
public disclosure of protocol exploits against LTE
did not occur until early 2016 [8], [18]. The main
reasons for this 9 year delay for security researchers
to identify vulnerabilities in LTE protocols and
testing them was the lack of maturity of software-
defined radio hardware and, mostly, the lack of
open-source low-cost software implementations of
the LTE protocol stack. However, openLTE [19]
became available in December 2012 and srsLTE
[20] just a couple of years later, and both these tools
were critical in the identification of the exploits in
[8], [18].
Since the release of those tools, over the last three
years, some academic research teams have delivered
excellent research and published groundbreaking
papers disclosing new vulnerabilities of the LTE
protocol [9], [10]. And now, with the availability
of srsUE [20], the possibilities are endless in terms
of exploring the security of LTE against the oper-
ators infrastructure and implementing fuzzing tests
against the LTE core network [21].
Things look substantially different in 5G. The
first release of the 5G specifications (3GPP Release
15) was published in December 2017, and the first
security specifications document was just published
in March 2018 [17]. However, now the field of
mobile protocol security is much more mature and
research teams have already started working and
identifying potential protocol vulnerabilities. De-
spite the lack of open-source implementations of the
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5G protocols and tools to facilitate this work, secu-
rity researchers have already identified a number of
protocol deficiencies in 5G [11]–[14], [22]. Table II
summarizes the main security vulnerabilities already
identified in 5G by security researchers.
It is worth noting that the first security analysis of
the 5G specifications [11] and, particularly, the 5G-
AKA protocol, was released before the publication
of Release 15, with the authors starting their work
early using the pre-release 3GPP drafts.
There is still a substantial amount of work to
be done in 5G security, but this time it will not
take years to identify security problems and start
fixing them. Instead, security issues in 5G are being
identified way before this protocol and the networks
it will empower go live. This time, the research
community, academia, industry and standardization
bodies will have plenty of time to work together
with the goal of designing a 5G security architecture
that will substantially raise the bar with respect to
previous generations.
III. AUTHENTICATION, PRIVACY AND PROTOCOL
EXPLOITS IN THE CONTEXT OF 5G
The first generation of mobile networks (1G)
lacked support for encryption and legacy 2G net-
works lack mutual authentication and implement an
outdated encryption algorithm. Combined with the
wide availability of open source implementations of
the GSM protocol stack, this has resulted in the
discovery of many possible exploits on the GSM
insecure radio link [6].
Specific efforts were made to substantially en-
hance confidentiality and authentication in mobile
networks, with much stronger cryptographic algo-
rithms and mutual authentication having been ex-
plicitly implemented in both 3G and LTE. Because
of this, LTE is generally considered secure given
this mutual authentication and strong encryption
scheme. As such, confidentiality and authentication
are wrongly assumed to be sufficiently guaranteed.
As it has been recently demonstrated, LTE mobile
networks are still vulnerable to protocol exploits,
location leaks and rogue base stations [7], [8].
It is of great importance that such exploits are
addressed in the context of 5G mobile networks. In
order to do so, the root cause of such security threats
must be addressed. Although there are other areas
where security should be enhanced, this manuscript
focuses on the following:
• Implicit trust in pre-authentication mes-
sages: The security and integrity of mobile
systems is vulnerable today due to the mere
fact that mobile devices inherently trust all
downlink pre-authentication messages coming
from anything that appears to be a legitimate
base station. The same applies for the implicit
trust in all uplink pre-authentication messages
originating to what appears to be a legitimate
mobile device.
• Legacy symmetric key security architec-
ture: The latest mobile standards still leverage
their entire security infrastructure on a rather
outdated, legacy symmetric key architecture.
Symmetric key systems allow for strong au-
thentication and encryption, but are not flexible
enough to provide new security features to
prevent basic downgrade or Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks or address the aforementioned
implicit trust in pre-authentication messages.
A. Implicit trust on pre-authentication messages
Despite the strong cryptographic protection of
user traffic and mutual authentication, a very large
number of control plane (signaling) messages are
regularly exchanged over an LTE radio link in
the clear. Before the authentication and encryption
steps of a connection are executed, a mobile device
engages in a substantial conversation with any LTE
base station (real or rogue) that advertises itself with
the correct broadcast information. This results in a
critical threat due to the implicit trust placed, from
the mobile device point of view, on the messages
coming from the base station. A large number of
operations with critical security implications are
executed when triggered by some of these implicitly
trusted messages, which are neither authenticated
nor validated. It is rather obvious that, in the age
of large scale cyber-attacks, one of the largest civil-
ian communication systems must rely on privacy
protocols far more sophisticated than just basic
implicit trust anchored on the fact that the base
station looks like a legitimate base station. Note that
the same applies in reverse, with the base station
implicitly trusting all pre-authentication messages
coming from the mobile device.
Table II summarizes some of the pre-
authentication messages that are implicitly trusted
by any LTE mobile device, as well as some critical
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TABLE I
5G SECURITY VULNERABILITIES ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY.
Vulnerable pro-
tocol
Details Reference
5G-AKA Weakness in 5G protocol could potentially allow a
malicious actor to impersonate an honest user against
network
[11]
5G-AKA Security goals and assumptions in 5G are underspecified
or missing, including central goals like agreement on
the session key.
[14]
5G security ar-
chitecture
A number of protocol edge cases that could result in the
transmission of the SUPI in the clear plus no solution
to pre-authentication message-based exploits
[13]
5G-AKA Vulnerability that can be exploited to mount activity
monitoring attacks, allowing an adversary to learn a
new type of privacy-sensitive information about the
subscribers
[12]
functions they can trigger. By exploiting such
messages, one can set up a rogue access point
that, despite not being capable of full interception
(Man in the Middle) of connections, can render
a mobile device useless (Denial of Service) [7],
[8], [10], track its whereabouts (privacy threat)
[7], [8], [23], instruct it to switch to an insecure
GSM connection (downgrade attack) [7], [10] and
other threats [9], [21]. Note that security based on
implicit trust is simply unacceptable in the context
of wireless systems applied to first responders,
national security and military tactical networks.
As discussed above, any mobile device trusts
and obeys the messages listed in Table II as long
as the base station advertises itself with the right
parameters. As long as the mobile device decodes
the expected broadcast information from the MIB
(Master Information Block) and SIB (System In-
formation Block) messages (i.e., the right MCC
[Mobile Country Code] and MNC [Mobile Network
Code]), the end point implicitly trusts the legitimacy
of the base station. Note that both the MIB and SIB
messages are broadcasted in the clear by every base
station and they can be eavesdropped using low-cost
radios and basic open-source tools [24].
The overall 5G security architecture must take a
leap forward and move away from implicit trust of
pre-authentication signaling messages. There must
be a method such that a mobile device can de-
termine the legitimacy of a base station prior to
engaging in any communication with it. Moreover,
the 5G system must guarantee the freshness of such
broadcast messages in order to prevent an adversary
from intercepting legitimate broadcast messages and
replaying them from a rogue access point. For
example, critical downlink signaling messages, as
well as MIB-SIB configuration messages, should be
enhanced with a signature and a hash of multiple
values, including a time stamp. However, note that,
as further discussed in Section III-B, such solutions
would only be possible by leveraging a PKI (Public
Key Infrastructure) architecture and the introduction
of a trusted Certificate Authority (CA).
Such a system should be designed to place most
of its computational and cryptographic complex-
ity on the infrastructure side. Meanwhile, the still
computationally-demanding operations on the de-
vice side would occur only in infrequent connection
events to a new access point. Moreover, secure
5G protocols should guarantee that certain criti-
cal Radio Resource Control (RRC) functions, such
as downgrading the connection to GSM, are only
possible once the terminal and the base station
have already authenticated mutually at least once
and never triggered by an implicitly trusted pre-
authentication message.
B. Legacy symmetric key security architecture
Despite the constant evolution of mobile proto-
cols, cellular networks still rely on an inflexible
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Types of message Messages Critical functions triggered
Radio Resource Control
(RRC)
RRC Coonection Request, RRC
Connection Setup, RRC
Connection Setup Response, RRC
Connection Reconfiguration, etc.
Radio connection characteristics,
mobility to a new cell, downgrade
to legacy radio protocol, etc.
Non Access Stratum
Attach Request, Attach Response,
Attach Reject, Location Update
Request, Location Update Reject,
etc.
Connection blocking, connection
throttling down to legacy protocol,
etc
Other Paging, Measurement Update, etc. Location measurements andlocation information
TABLE II
UNPROTECTED PRE-AUTHENTICATION MESSAGES IMPLICITLY TRUSTED IN LTE MOBILE NETWORKS
legacy symmetric key architecture. Although mod-
ern LTE mobile networks implement mutual authen-
tication, the mobile device is not truly authenticating
the network (i.e., the cell network operator). Instead,
it is verifying that the network has a copy of the
user’s secret key.
Given this symmetric-key implementation, the
cryptographic protocols of current mobile networks
do not provide, as opposed to PKI-based systems,
a means to uniquely identify each party. There is a
need to define and store a secret identifier for each
subscriber. This secret identity, the IMSI (Interna-
tional Mobile Subscriber Identifier), is verified via
the symmetric-key authentication handshake and a
temporary identifier, the TMSI (Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identifier), is derived.
Although the IMSI should always be kept private
and never transmitted over the air, it is intuitive
that it will be required to transmit it over the air
- unprotected and unencrypted - at least once. The
very first time a mobile device is switched on and
attempts to attach to the network, it only has one
possible unique identifier to use in order to identify
itself and authenticate with the network: the IMSI.
5G wireless systems should move away from
this legacy infrastructure exclusively based on
symmetric-key cryptography and embrace the pos-
sibilities of a PKI-based system. Although this
would result in substantially higher computational
complexity, one could argue that, on one hand, such
cryptographic handshakes occur infrequently and,
on the other hand, the great majority of wireless
hardware modules are commonly equipped with
public key hardware accelerators. Embracing public
key cryptography for future mobile systems has
indeed been argued for many years already [25].
There are proposals in the 5G specifications to
never disclose the SUPI in the clear. As such, the
mobile device transmits its SUPI encrypted with the
home operators public key in the form of SUCI.
There are still a number of protocol edge cases,
which, if triggered by an adversary, would poten-
tially result in the disclosure of the SUPI in the
clear [13].
Despite this specific SUPI protection mechanism,
5G mobile protocols still lack of a clear proposal to
tackle the challenge of pre-authentication messages.
As discussed in Section III-A, the implicit trust both
ends of the communication place on messages that
could be coming, for example, from a malicious
base station is a critical challenge that must be
addressed in 5G. To this end, 5G communication
systems should integrate mature technology used in
communication networks since more than 20 years
ago by fully implementing a PKI-based architecture
[26]. By means of issuing digital certificates for
operators and maintaining a centralized trusted CA,
mobile devices could efficiently validate and verify
the authenticity of all messages received from a base
station. This would effectively resolve the challenge
of pre-authentication messages, making this type of
messages actually non-existent
A public-key infrastructure for 5G radio access
systems could also be leveraged to authenticate
broadcast messages without an actual handshake.
As discussed in Section III-A, broadcast messages
could be signed with a private key from the net-
work operator to verify their legitimacy prior to
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establishing any connection. Moreover, a hash of
certain features could be included in the message -
and signed as well - in order to guarantee freshness
of the message and prevent replay attacks.
There is hope in the horizon, though, as re-
searchers are already proposing security solutions
for both LTE and 5G that check all the aforemen-
tioned requirements [27].
IV. ATTACKING MOBILE NETWORKS WITH
LOW-COST AND OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS
The security redesign of 5G mobile networks
should be strongly motivated by the current avail-
ability of test and experimentation tools. Over the
last few years, a number of open source projects
have been developed which provide the right tools
for sophisticated LTE security research. Running
on off-the-shelf software radio platforms, these
open source libraries provide the functionality of
a software-based base station and, in some cases,
the implementation of the endpoint software stack
as well. With some rather simple modifications of
the code, these tools can easily be turned into
LTE protocol analyzers, stingrays and rogue base
stations.
The two main LTE open source implementations
being actively used in the research world can be
summarized as follows:
• openLTE [19]: The most advanced open
source implementation of the LTE stack until
two years ago. It provides a fully-functional
LTE access network, including the features of
the LTE packet core network. With proper
configuration, it can operate NAS protocols
and provide access to the Internet for mobile
devices. It implements the HSS functionality
on a text file storing IMSI-key pairs. It only
requires a few lines of code to turn it into a
stingray or a device that will block access to all
smartphones and mobile devices in its vicinity
[7].
• srsLTE [20]: Currently this is, by far, the most
complete and sophisticated implementation of
the LTE stack, being used by the great majority
of academic research teams. It provides full
implementation of layer one and two, including
features of the LTE core network. The srsLTE
project recently introduced srsUE, an imple-
mentation of the UE stack that allows one to
emulate the communication between a mobile
device and a base station. This new tool, srsUE,
is already being leveraged to experiment with
fuzzing tests against the operator’s infrastruc-
ture [21]. Based on the srsLTE engine, Air-
Probe is a fully functional LTE scanner that
captures over the air downlink LTE traffic,
which can be analyzed offline using Wireshark
and other standard software.
Note that a third open-source testbed, OpenAir-
Interface [28], is also widely used in the research
community, mainly in Europe. This is a tool the
author has never used, though.
Most open source implementations can be run
using standard off-the-shelf software radios, such
as the USRP from Ettus Research [29]. This tool
allows both passive and active experimentation, as
it provides both transmit and receive features. A full,
advanced set-up for LTE radio experimentation can
be acquired for under $2,000.
With this budget of under $2,000 and a powerful,
yet fairly standard, Linux computer, one can run a
custom LTE IMSI catcher or rogue base station. On
one hand, such wide availability of low-cost open-
source tools for mobile network experimentation is
positive, as it opens the doors for brilliant security
researchers to improve the security of communica-
tion systems used by billions of people. On the other
hand, such tools also substantially lower the bar
for attacks on mobile communication systems and
should be taken into consideration when designing
the security architecture of 5G systems.
It is important to note that, although the 5G spec-
ifications were released about a year ago, there are
already some software implementations available
for researchers [30]. This has strong implications as,
on one hand, provides the right tools to researchers
to investigate the security of the 5G specifications
and, on the other hand, empowers the industry to
collaborate with academia and the research world
to improve the security of 5G.
V. SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS FOR 5G
As discussed in previous sections, one of the main
goals for 5G mobile communication systems was
both to address known security weaknesses in LTE
systems as well as strengthen the overall security
architecture in order to service critical technologies
such as V2V and V2E. However, as discussed in
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Section II, just one year after the release of the
5G security specifications, researchers have already
identified a number of new vulnerabilities in 5G
[11], [12], [14] and the main security challenges
from LTE not fully addressed [13].
Despite security being still an unsolved problem
in 5G, the Release 15 protocol specifications intro-
duce an important step in the right direction. By
introducing the concept of operator public keys, 5G
systems provide the tools to identify mobile users
without the need of ever disclosing the SUPI in
the clear. This private identifier is concealed into
the SUCI using the home operator’s public key
and a probabilistic asymmetric encryption method
to prevent identity tracking [17]. However, such ap-
proach is not valid to prevent all pre-authentication
message-based exploit that tamper the security of
LTE systems [13].
The proposed security solution, despite effec-
tive in protecting against IMSI/SUPI catchers, does
not scale system-wide. Instead, 5G mobile systems
should finally integrate into cellular systems ma-
ture technologies that furnish the core of today’s
Internet security architecture, such as Digital Cer-
tificates. Such digital constructs, used in millions
of transactions in the Internet every day, certify the
ownership of a public key and thus would allow
mobile devices to verify the authenticity and validity
of all pre-authentication messages coming from all
base stations from all operators. Digital Certificates,
actually, would relent the term ”pre-authentication
message” obsolete as any device would be able to
authenticate and validate the source of all messages
in 5G.
In order to successfully implement such archi-
tecture, the 5G specifications should also introduce
the concept of a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)
and a root of trust to establish the authenticity
of such certificates. Despite the fact that mobile
networks could operate under a multi-CA chain of
trust, the entire ecosystem should rely on a single
CA that could be operated by a trusted 3rd party
or, for example, a consortium of operators and/or
standardization bodies. On top of that, regional CAs
could be leveraged in different geographical regions
or countries, while each mobile operator could be
the last step in the root of trust for digital certificates
signing pre-authentication messages.
It is important to note that, at the time of releasing
this article, a team of researchers responsible for
some of the most recent breakthroughs in LTE
security [23], recently presented a potential solution
[27]. The authors propose a Digital Certifcate-based
solution aimed at signing and authenticating the
broadcast messages. This excellent solution, similar
to a technology proposed a few years ago [31], also
includes a hash of a time–stamp in the signature to
avoid replay attacks and, in general, improves pre-
viously proposed solutions. This recent technology
is a great example of the direction 5G should take
in order to enhance the security of mobile cellular
communication systems today and tomorrow.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the significant technology improvements
from legacy 2G networks to current LTE systems,
the overall architecture and functionality of cellular
networks still contains strong ties to outdated legacy
technologies. Also, certain simple features are now
long overdue for a systematic redesign that also con-
siders the current cyber-security landscape and the
low-cost availability of tools that can be leveraged
to attack a mobile network (e.g., the unnecessary
disclosure of location information from the PHY
layer identifiers and privacy leaks linked to the
paging protocol and the implicit trust on messages
that come from a node that seems to be a legitimate
base station).
In parallel, the legacy circuit-switched architec-
ture of mobile networks still poses a great challenge
for massive connectivity of embedded devices in
the context of IoT. Although this challenge can
currently be addressed through virtualization, this
is not an appropriate long-term solution. In the era
of packet-switched traffic and global IP networks,
mobile systems should be redesigned accordingly
to scale towards the massive connectivity goal of
5G systems.
As the next evolutionary step in wireless com-
munications is taken, the industry has the perfect
chance to embrace a holistic approach to security,
as opposed to a set of functionalities and procedures
attached to the overall architecture. This document
summarizes some of the security challenges that
must be addressed as mobile technology transitions
towards 5G. Along with some of the key goals
for future wireless systems, such as massive con-
nectivity and sub-millisecond latency, the industry,
academia and standards bodies should join forces
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to spearhead a true overall architecture redesign to
address inherent vulnerabilities.
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